Interactions between digital technology and social logics can produce a third condition that is a mix of both. When this mixed domain gets structured in electronic space we call it a digital formation (see Latham and Sassen, this volume). This chapter focuses on two such formations, the global market for capital, and global electronic activist networks. In both cases my organizing question concerns the operation of social logics and how they shape and are in turned shaped by these technologies. The focus is, then, on both the transformative capacities of these new computer-centered technologies as well as their limits, limits partly set by social logics. The two very different types of cases examined in this chapter make legible the variable ways in which this socio-technical interaction produces outcomes.
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fourfold in Japan over that same period, and they more than doubled in Germany and in Switzerland. In the U.S., institutional investors as a group came to manage two-fifths of US households' financial assets by the early 1990s, up from one fifth in 1980. Another marking feature is that today the global capital market is increasingly a necessary component of a growing range of types of transactions, such as the diversity of government debts that now get financed through the global market: increasingly kinds of debt that were thought to be basically local, such as municipal debt, are now entering this market. The overall growth in the value of financial instruments and assets also is evident with US institutional investors whose assets had risen from 59% of GDP in 1980 to 126% by 1993.
(INSERT TABLE 1) (4.6) As for the phase that began in the late 1990s, besides the growth of older types of institutional investors there is a proliferation of institutional investors with extremely speculative investment strategies. Hedge funds are among the most speculative of these institutions; they sidestep certain disclosure and leverage regulations by having a small private clientele and, frequently, by operating offshore. While they are not new, the growth in their size and their capacity to affect the functioning of markets certainly grew enormously in the 1990s and they emerged as a major force by the late 1990s. According to some estimates they numbered 1, 200 with assets of over $150 billion by mid-1998 mid- (BIS 2000 , which was more than the $122 billion in assets of the total of almost 1,500 equity funds as of October 1997 (UNCTAD 1998 . To put these figures in perspective, both of these types of funds need to be distinguished from asset management funds, of which the top ten are estimated to have $10 trillion under management. 7 It is particularly in the world of short-term flows and speculative investors that Edited by Latham and Sassen Princeton University Press digitization has had transformative consequences. Two sets of properties need to be emphasized here. One set --instantaneous transmission, interconnectivity and speed--has transformed the character of financial transactions. A major consequence has been the sharp jump in the volume and the overall value of transactions. The other set of properties has to do with computerization, specifically, the possibility of computerizing mathematics. This has enabled the development of enormously complex financial instruments and, very importantly, their widespread use in that they could be packaged into reasonably simple-to-use software. One major consequence has been the increase in the industry's capacities to liquefy assets.
These two sets of properties have contributed to a third major difference, the explosion in and demand for financial innovations. Innovations are not new to finance, nor is the fact that an effect of innovations is to raise the supply of financial instruments that are tradeable --sold on the open market. The crucial difference between earlier phases and the contemporary phase is one of thresholds and the extent to which a change in thresholds can be interpreted as a qualitative transformation. The increased digitization of both transactions and instruments discussed above has enabled the work of producing innovations and has enabled the workability of a variety of new but also older innovations. While it is true that much of this innovation centers on derivatives and that the concept of the derivative is an old one, today we have seen a multiplication of types of derivatives and a sharp increase in the complexity of many of these types of derivatives. 8 This in turn has led to what we might describe as the growing embeddedness of financial instrument development in academic economics (MacKenzie 2003 , Callon 1998 . Digitization of transactions and instruments has been central to this multiplication of types of derivatives and their increased complexity. The overall result has been a massive increase in the extent to which the financial industry has been able to securitize various forms of what were previously considered untradeable assets or were simply not considered as assets, e.g. many forms of debt. 9 Mediated through these specifics of contemporary finance and financial markets, digitization can then be seen as having contributed to a vast increase in the numbers of transactions that in turn translates into increased volumes and values.
At a macro-institutional level, the proliferation of innovative derivatives has furthered the linking of national markets by producing specific types of incentives. For instance, various kinds of derivatives make it easier to exploit, or arbitrage, price differences among diverse financial instruments. One indicator is the growing importance of cross border transactions measured in terms of their value as a percentage of GDP in the leading developed economies. Table 2 presents this information for bonds and equities in a handful of these countries and shows the recency of this accelerated increase. For instance, the value of such transactions in the US represented 4% of GDP in 1975 4% of GDP in , 35% in 1985 when the new financial era is in full swing, a quadrupling by 1995, and reached 230% of GDP in 1998. Other countries show even sharper increases. In Germany this share grew from 5% in 1975 to 334% in 1998; in France it went from 5% in 1980 to 415% in 1998. In part, this entails escalating levels of risk and innovation driving the industry; indeed, it is only over the last decade and a half that we see this acceleration.
INSERT TABLE 2 ((5.3))
The drive to produce innovations is one of the marking features of the financial era that begins in the 1980s. The history of finance is in many ways a long history of innovations. But what is, perhaps, different today is the intensity of the current phase and the multiplication of instruments that lengthen the distance between the financial instrument and actual underlying 
I.B. In The Digital Era: More Concentration Than Dispersal?
A second major set of issues about the transformative capacities of digitization has to do with the limits of technologically driven change, or, in other words, with the point at which this global electronic market for capital runs into the walls of its embeddedness in non-digital conditions.
There are two distinct issues here. One is the extent to which the global market for capital even though global and digital is actually embedded in multiple environments, some indeed global in scale but others subnational, i.e. the actual financial centers within which the exchanges are located. A second issue is the extent to which it remains concentrated in a limited number of the most powerful financial centers notwithstanding its character as a global electronic market.
In theory, the intensification of deregulation and the instituting of policies in various countries aimed at creating a supportive cross-border environment for financial transactions, could have dramatically changed the locational logic of the industry. This is especially the case because it is a digitized and globalized industry that produces highly mobile outputs. It could be argued that the one major feature that could keep this industry from having locational constraints would be regulation. With deregulation that constraint should be disappearing. Other factors such as the premium paid for location in major cities should be a deterrent to locate there, and with the Further, even accepting the notion that this market needs financial centers, given the costs of operating in major centers we might expect a shift of operations to lower order financial centers given their lower prices compared to the major centers; thus, we would expect a shift from the leading to lesser centers.
Today, then, we might expect the actual spatial organization of the industry to be a much better indicator of its market-driven locational dynamics than was the case in earlier phases with more regulation and less digitization. We have seen considerable deregulation in the industry, the incorporation of a growing number of national financial centers into a global market, and the sharp increase in digitization of transactions and instruments. This would hold especially for the international level given the earlier prevalence of highly regulated and closed national markets.
There has, indeed, been geographic decentralization of certain types of financial activities, aimed at securing business in the growing number of countries becoming integrated into the global economy. Many of the leading investment banks have operations in more countries than they had 20 years ago. The same can be said for the leading sister industries, such as accounting, legal, and other specialized corporate services that now need to deliver a global service to their corporate clients; a good indicator of this is the explosive growth in these firms' networks of overseas affiliates (Taylor et al. 2002, see generally GAWC) . And it can be said for some markets: for example, in the 1980s all basic wholesale foreign exchange operations were in London. Today these are distributed between London and several other centers (even though their number is far smaller than the number of countries whose currency is being traded).
But empirically what stands out in the evidence about the global financial markets after a decade and a half of deregulation, worldwide integration, and major advances in electronic Trade Center (albeit that this Center was not largely a financial complex) and damaged over fifty surrounding buildings home to much financial activity. The level of damage was seen by many as a wake-up call about the vulnerabilities of sharp spatial centralization in a limited number of sites. Table 3 below shows the extent to which the pre-September 11 levels of concentration in stock market capitalization in a limited number of global financial centers held after the attacks (see , Table 3 ). 11 Table 4 shows the foreign listings in the major markets, further indicating that location in a set of financial markets is one of the features of the global capital market; the fact that it is a global digital market does not seem to reduce the need for being present in the actual centers where the exchanges are located. New Delhi and Calcutta in India. These are all enormous countries and one might have thought that they could sustain multiple major financial centers; and even though many of the secondary centers may be thriving, the point is that the leading centers have gained national share. This pattern is evident in many countries, including the leading economies of the world.
12
Consolidation of one leading financial center in each country is an integral part of the growth dynamics in the sector rather than the result of losses in the losing cities.
There is both consolidation in fewer major centers across and within countries and a sharp growth in the numbers of centers that become part of the global network as countries deregulate their economies and the global economy expands accordingly. Bombay, for instance 
I.C. The Continuing Utility Of Spatial Agglomeration
The continuing weight of major centers is, in a way, countersensical, as is, for that matter, the existence of an expanding network of financial centers. The rapid development of electronic exchanges, the growing digitization of much financial activity, the fact that finance has become one of the leading sectors in a growing number of countries, and that it is a sector that produces a digital, hypermobile product, all suggest that location should not matter. In fact geographic dispersal would seem to be a good option given the high cost of operating in major financial centers. Further, the last ten years have seen an increased geographic mobility of financial and E*Trade rely on traders and banks which are located somewhere, with at least some in a major financial center. The question of risk and how it is handled and perceived is yet another factor which has an impact on how the industry organizes itself, where it locates operations, what markets become integrated into the global capital market, and so on.
One fact that has become increasingly evident is that to maximize the benefits of the new information technologies firms need not only the infrastructure but also a complex mix of other resources. In my analysis organizational complexity is a key variable allowing firms to maximize the utility/benefits they can derive from using digital technology (Sassen 2001: 115-116 A second fact that is emerging with greater clarity concerns the meaning of "information." There are two types of information (Sassen 2001: chapter 5) . One is the datum, which may be complex yet is standard knowledge: the level at which a stock market closes, a privatization of a public utility, the bankruptcy of a bank. But there is a far more difficult type of "information," akin to an interpretation/evaluation/judgment. It entails negotiating a series of datums and a series of interpretations of a mix of datums in the hope of producing a higher order datum. Access to the first kind of information is now global and immediate from just about any place in the highly developed world thanks to the digital revolution. But it is the second type of information that requires a complicated mixture of elements --the social infrastructure for global connectivity--that gives major financial centers a leading edge.
It is possible, in principle, to reproduce the technical infrastructure anywhere. Singapore, for example, has technical connectivity matching Hong Kong's. But does it have Hong Kong's social connectivity? At a higher level of global social connectivity we could probably say the same for Frankfurt and London. When the more complex forms of information needed to execute major international deals cannot be gotten from existing data bases, no matter what one can pay, then one needs the social information loop and the associated de facto interpretations and inferences that come with bouncing off information among talented, informed people. It is the weight of this input that has given a whole new importance to credit rating agencies, for instance.
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Part of the rating has to do with interpreting and inferring. When this interpreting becomes "authoritative" it becomes "information" available to all. The process of making inferences/interpretations into "information" takes quite a mix of talents and resources.
In brief, financial centers provide the social connectivity that allows a firm or market to maximize the benefits of its technical connectivity.
ii These developments make clear a second important trend that in many ways specifies the current global era. These various centers don't just compete with each other: there is collaboration and division of labor. In the international system of the post war decades, each country's financial center, in principle, covered the universe of necessary functions to service its national companies and markets. The world of finance was, of course, much simpler than it is today. In the initial stages of deregulation in the 1980s there was a strong tendency to see the relation among the major centers as one of straight competition when it came to international transactions. New York, London and Tokyo, then the major centers in the system, were seen as competing. But in my research in the late 1980s on these three top centers I found clear evidence One way of describing this process is as an incipient and highly specialized denationalization of particular institutional arenas (Sassen 1996 : chapter one, Sassen 2004 . It can be argued that such denationalization is a necessary condition for economic globalization as we know it today. The sophistication of this system lies in the fact that it only needs to involve strategic institutional areas --most national systems can be left basically unaltered. China is a good example. It adopted international accounting rules in 1993, necessary to engage in international transactions. To do so it did not have to change much of its domestic economy.
Japanese firms operating overseas adopted such standards long before Japan's government considered requiring them. In this regard the "wholesale" side of globalization is quite different from the global consumer markets, in which success necessitates altering national tastes at a mass level. This process of denationalization has been strengthened by state policy enabling privatization and foreign acquisition. In some ways one might say that the Asian financial crisis has functioned as a mechanism to denationalize, at least partly, control over key sectors of economies that, while allowing the massive entry of foreign investment, never relinquished that control.
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Major international business centers produce what we could think of as a new subculture, a move from the "national" version of international activities to the "denationalized" version. The 
II. A POLITICS OF PLACES ON GLOBAL CIRCUITS: THE LOCAL AS MULTISCALAR
The issue I want to highlight here concerns the ways in which particular instantiations of the local can actually be constituted at multiple scales and thereby construct global formations that tend towards lateralized and horizontal networks. I examine this through a focus on various political practices and technologies used. Of particular interest is the possibility that local, often resource-poor organizations and individuals can become part of global networks and struggles.
These practices are constituting a specific type of global politics, one that runs through localities and is not predicated on the existence of global institutions. The engagement can be with global institutions, such as the IMF or WTO, or with local institutions, such as a particular government or local police force charged with human rights abuses. Theoretically these types of global politics illuminate the distinction between a global network and the actual transactions that constitute it: the global character of a network does not necessarily imply that its transactions are equally global, or that it all has to happen at the global level. It shows the local to be multiscalar in a parallel to the preceding section which showed the global to be multi-scalar --i.e. partly embedded in a network of localities, specifically, financial centers.
Computer centered technologies have also here made all the difference; in this case the particular form of these technologies is mostly the public access Internet. 17 The latter matters not only because of low-cost connectivity and the possibility of effective use (via e-mail) even with
Edited by Latham and Sassen Princeton University Press low bandwidth availability, but also and most importantly, because of some of its key features.
Simultaneous decentralized access can help local actors have a sense of participation in struggles that are not necessarily global but are, rather, globally distributed in that they recur in locality after locality. In so doing these technologies can also help in the formation of cross-border public spheres for these types of actors, and can do so a) without the necessity of running through global institutions 18 , and b) through forms of recognition that do not depend on much direct interaction and joint action on the ground. Among the implications of these options are the possibility of forming global networks that bypass central authority, and, further, especially significant for resource-poor organizations, that those who may never be able to travel can nonetheless be part of global struggles and global publics. 
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As has been widely recognized by now, new ICTS do not simply replace existing media techniques. The evidence is far from systematic and the object of study is continuously undergoing change. But we can basically identify two patterns. On the one hand it might mean no genuine need for these particular technologies given the nature of the organizing or it might come down to underutilization. (For studies of particular organizations see e.g. (Tsaliki 2002 , Lannon 2002 . 20 For instance, a survey of local and grassroots human rights NGOs in several regions of the world found that the Internet makes exchange of information easier and is helpful in developing other kinds of collaboration, but that it did not helps launch joint projects (Lannon 2002: 33) . On the other hand, there is evidence of highly creative ways of using the new ICTs Thus Amnesty International's International Secretariat has set up an infrastructure to collect electronic news feeds via satellite, which it then processes and redistributes to its staff
workstations (Lebert 2002).
But there is also evidence that use of these technologies has led to the formation of new types of organizations and activism. 
NGO, the Institute for Global Communication (IGC). In 1993 LaNeta became a member of APC and began to function as a key connection between civil society organizations in and outside
Mexico. In this regard, it is interesting to note than a local movement made LaNeta into a transnational information hub.
There is little doubt that the gathering, storage and dissemination of information are crucial functions for these kinds of organizations (Meyer 1997, Tuijl and Jordan 1999 There are many examples of such types of cross-border political work. We can distinguish two forms of it, each capturing a specific type of scalar interaction. In one the scale of struggle remains the locality and the object is to engage local actors, e.g. a local housing or environmental agency, but with the knowledge and explicit or tacit invocation of multiple other localities around the world engaged in similar localized struggles with similar local actors. It is this combination of multiplication and self-reflexivity that contributes to constitute a global condition out of these localized practices and rhetorics. It means, in a sense, taking Cox's notion of scaled "spaces of engagement" constitutive of local politics and situating it in a specific type of context, not necessarily the one Cox himself might have had in mind. Beyond the fact of relations between scales as crucial to local politics, it is perhaps the social and political construction itself of scale as social action (Howitt 1993 , Swyngedouw 1997 , Brenner 1998 These features can be illustrated with the case of SPARC (Society for the Promotion of Area Resources). This is an organization that began as an effort to organize slum dwellers in Bombay to get housing. Its purpose is to organize urban and rural poor, especially women, to develop their capabilities to organize around issues of concern. The focus is local, and so are the participants and those whom they seek to reach, usually local governments. But they have established multiple networks with other similar organizations and efforts in other Asian countries and now also some cities in Latin America and Africa. The various organizations making up the broader network do not necessarily gain power or material resources from this global networking, but they gain strength for themselves and vis a vis the agencies to which they make their demands.
The second form of multi-scalar interaction is one where localized struggles are aiming at engaging global actors, e.g. WTO, IMF, or multinational firms, either at the global scale or in multiple localities. Local initiatives can become part of a global network of activism without losing the focus on specific local struggles. (E.g., Cleaver 1998, Espinoza 1999, Ronfeldt et al. 1998 , Mele 1999 . 27 This is one of the key forms of critical politics that the Internet can make possible: A politics of the local with a big difference--these are localities that are connected with each other across a region, a country or the world. From struggles around human rights and the environment to workers strikes and Aids campaigns against the large pharmaceutical firms, the Internet has emerged as a powerful medium for non-elites to communicate, support each other's struggles and create the equivalent of insider groups at scales going from the local to the global. 28 The possibility of doing so transnationally at a time when a growing set of issues are seen as escaping the bounds of nation states makes this even more significant
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Yet another key scalar element here is that digital networks can be used by political activists for global transactions but they can also be used for strengthening local communications and transactions inside a city. The architecture of digital networks, primed to span the world, can actually serve to intensify transactions among residents of a city or region, it can serve to make them aware of neighboring communities, gain an understanding of local issues that resonate positively or negatively with communities that are right there in the same city rather than with those that are at the other end of the world (Riemens and Lovink 2002) . Recovering how the new digital technology can serve to support local initiatives and alliances inside a locality is conceptually important given the almost exclusive emphasis in the representation of these technologies of their global scope and deployment.
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Coming back to Howitt's (1993) point about the constructing of the geographical scales at which social action can occur, let me suggest that cyberspace is, perhaps ironically, a far more concrete space for social struggles than that of the national political system. It becomes a place where non-formal political actors can be part of the political scene in a way that is much more difficult in national institutional channels. Nationally, politics needs to run through existing formal systems: whether the electoral political system or the judiciary (taking state agencies to court). Non-formal political actors are rendered invisible in the space of national politics.
Cyberspace can accommodate a broad range of social struggles and facilitate the emergence of new types of political subjects that do not have to go through the formal political system.
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Individuals and groups that have historically been excluded from formal political systems and whose struggles can be partly enacted outside those systems, can find in cyberspace an enabling environment both for their emergence as non-formal political actors and for their struggles.
The types of political practice discussed here are not the cosmopolitan route to the 9 There are significant differences by country in the extent to which these innovations have been implemented. For instance and in general terms, securitization is well advanced in the U.S., but just beginning in most of Europe. But there is now a broader geography to the Manhattan financial sector than was the case before September 2001: it includes growing concentrations of at least partial components of firms in specific areas of New Jersey and
Connecticut. In my interpretation there are two issues to factor in. One of these is that the destruction of office space can be seen as a brutal elimination of inertia in the financial sector, where many of these firms have grown enormously and have kept huge workforces --of 10,000 employees in several cases--when only a fraction of these needs to be located in a major financial center. The second issue is that, given digitization, "spatial centrality" can be constituted through diverse actual geographies (Sassen 2001: chapter 5) . The geography of the downtown business center is but one of these. A second type of geography is that of the larger metropolitan area where a variety of dense business nodes are connected via state of the art conventional infrastructure and digital networks. A third is the network of global cities, constituted through the multiple digital and other transactions among various firms in these cities. In the case of the Manhattan financial industry all three geographies have been present throughout the 1980s and 1990s; September 11 has strengthened the second type.
12 In France, Paris today concentrates larger shares of most financial sectors than it did 10 years ago and once important stock markets like Lyon have become "provincial," even though Lyon is today the hub of a thriving economic region. Milano privatized its exchange in September 1997 and electronically merged Italy's 10 regional markets. Frankfurt now concentrates a larger share of the financial market in Germany than it did in the early 1980s, and so does Zurich, which once had Basel and Geneva as significant competitors.
13 This one of the seven organizing hypotheses through which I specified my global city model. For a full explanation see Sassen 2001 , especially the Preface to the New Edition.
14 Global firms and markets in the financial industry need enormous resources, a trend which is leading to rapid mergers and acquisitions of firms and strategic alliances among markets in different countries. These are happening on a scale and in combinations few would have foreseen as recently as the early 1990s. There are growing numbers of mergers among respectively financial services firms, accounting firms, law firms, insurance brokers, in brief, These are but some of the best known examples. Much valuable property in the Ginza--Tokyo's high priced shopping and business district--is now being considered for acquisition by foreign investors, in a twist on Mitsubishi's acquisition of Rockefeller Center a decade earlier.
17 While the Internet is a crucial medium in these political practices, it is important to emphasize that beginning in the 1990s, particularly since the mid-1990s we have entered a new phase in the history of digital networks, one when powerful corporate actors and high performance networks are strengthening the role of private digital space and altering the structure of public-access digital space (Sassen 2002) . Digital space has emerged not simply as a means for communicating, but as a major new theater for capital accumulation and the operations of global capital.
Yet civil society --in all its various incarnations--is also an increasingly energetic presence in cyberspace. (For a variety of angles, see e.g. Rimmer and Morris-Suzuki 1999 , Poster 1997 , Frederick 1993 , Miller and Slater 2000 . Language or IDML). The value of such Open Standards is that they enable information sharing. 20 In a study of the websites of international and national environmental NGOs in Finland, UK , Netherlands, Spain and Greece, Tsaliki (2002:15) concludes that the Internet is mainly useful for intra-and inter-organizational collaboration and networking, mostly complementing already existing media techniques for issue promotion and awareness raising. 23 But, it must be noted, that even in this campaign, centered as it was on the global south and determined as it was to communicate with global south organizations, the latter were often unable to access the sites (Kuntze, Rottmann, and Symons 2002). 24 There are many other, somewhat less known campaigns. For instance, when Intel announced that it would include a unique personal serial number in its new PentiumIII processing chips, privacy advocacy groups objected to this invasion of privacy. Three groups in different locations set up a joint website called Big Brother Inside to provide an organizational space for advocacy groups operating in two different countries, thereby also enabling them to use the place-specific resources of the different localities (Leizerov 2000) . The WashingtonDC based group Public Citizen put an early draft of the MAI agreement (a confidential document being negotiated by the OECD behind closed doors) on its website in 1997 launching a global campaign that brought these negotiations to a halt about eight months later. And these campaigns do not always directly engage questions of power. For instance, Reclaim the Streets started in London as a way to contest the Criminal Justice Act in England that granted the police broad powers to seize sound equipment and otherwise discipline ravers. One tactic was to hold street parties in cities 25 Though with other objectives in mind, a similar mix of conditions can also partly explain the growth of transnational economic and political support networks among immigrants (e.g. Smith 1994 , Smith 1997 , CorderoGuzmán et al. 2000 , Escuu and Gsech 2002 26 Some of these issues are well developed in Adam's (1996) study of the Tiananmen Square uprisings of 1989, the popular movement for democracy in the Philippines in the mid-1980s, and the U.S. civil rights movement in the 1950s. Protest, resistance, autonomy and consent can be constructed at scales that can escape the confines of territorially-bounded jurisdictions.
27 One might distinguish a third type of political practice along these lines, one which turns a single event into a global media event which then in turn serves to mobilize individuals and organizations around the world either or both in support of that initial action or around similar such occurrences elsewhere. Among the most powerful of these actions, and now emblematic of this type of politics, are the Zapatistas' initial and several subsequent actions.
The possibility of a single human rights abuse case becoming a global media event has been a powerful tool for human rgiths activists. 28 The Internet may continue to be a space for democratic practices, but it will be so partly as a form of resistance against overarching powers of the economy and of hierarchical power (e.g. Calabrese and Burgelman 1999, see also Warf and Grimes 1997) , rather than the space of unlimited freedom that is part of its romantic representation. The images we need to bring into this representation increasingly need to deal with contestation and resistance to commercial and military interests, rather than simply freedom and interconnectivity (Sassen 2002 
